

Supplementary Appendix: Towards a Causal Test of United States Security Interests and Humanitarian Aid

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1 Introduction to the Appendix

The supplementary material presented in this document provides additional details about the models presented in the paper “Towards a Causal Test of United States Security Interests and Humanitarian Aid”. The main article makes reference to the materials contained here. The R code necessary to implement the models will be made publicly available here: REDACTED.

Below, we report sample size statistics before and after matching for each of the algorithms and the results model estimates. We then present graphical results, which summarize the treatment effects from each of the models estimated after matching in addition to a matching permutation. Recall that in the main analysis we used three matching algorithm to create a group of control units that were as statistically similar to the treatment units as possible. For the permutation tests, we wanted to determine if there was a treatment effect between the treatment group and some other random combination of control units not selected by the matching algorithm. To check for this possibility we ran 10,000 regressions using the same 10%, 20%, and 100% treatment observations in each regression respectively. The control units were sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of treatment units ($1 * n$ when we used 100% of the treatment units.). Only a tiny fraction of these random control groups yielded. We plot the histogram of the treatment effect coefficients along with the coefficients from the models estimated after matching. These tests provide additional evidence for results presented in the main paper.

We also subset the data into Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. And also run the model using two alternative dependent variables: aid per capita and aid as percentage of GDP. The average treatment effect is consistent using the three dependent variables. The treatment is stronger during the Cold War period compared to the Post-Cold War period. The treatment effect strengthens in the 2001-2005 period compared to the earlier Post-Cold War periods of 1991-1995 and 1996-2000. The treatment effect for food aid in the Post-Cold War period washes out during the 90s but returns in the 2001-2005 period.

Finally, we present four examples (1975, 1985, 1995, 2005) of the documentation used to identify the countries for which trade with United States for munitions is strictly prohibited by law, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR §126.1).

2 Model Results

2.1 Results After Nearest Neighbor Matching

Table 1: Sample Sizes After Nearest Neighbor Nearest Neighbor Matching

	Control	Treated
All	5063	509
Matched	509	509
Unmatched	4554	0




Figure 1: Balance plot after nearest neighbor matching.

2.1.1 Economic Aid Tables

Table 2: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates After Nearest Neighbor Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	12.848	0.335	38.310	0.000
treatment	-4.421	0.474	-9.321	0.000

Table 3: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates After Nearest Neighbor Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	37.146	3.069	12.103	0.000
treatment	-2.837	0.419	-6.775	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{t-1}	3.387	0.365	9.273	0.000
<i>latent repression</i> _{t-1}	0.251	0.252	0.998	0.318
<i>drought</i> _{t-1}	0.856	0.705	1.214	0.225
<i>flood</i> _{t-1}	3.083	0.480	6.426	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{t-1}	0.449	0.655	0.686	0.493
<i>ln Population</i> _{t-1}	-0.853	0.223	-3.824	0.000
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{t-1}	-2.632	0.263	-10.022	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{t-1}	0.727	0.199	3.655	0.000
<i>ln exports</i> _{t-1}	1.291	0.189	6.819	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{t-1} <i>) * (ln exports</i> _{t-1} <i>)</i>	-0.120	0.029	-4.091	0.000

2.1.2 Food Aid Tables

Table 4: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates After Nearest Neighbor Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	9.408	0.369	25.509	0.000
treatment	-2.798	0.522	-5.365	0.000

Table 5: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates After Nearest Neighbor Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	45.000	3.313	13.583	0.000
treatment	-1.655	0.452	-3.662	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{t-1}	3.755	0.394	9.524	0.000
<i>latent repression</i> _{t-1}	-1.159	0.272	-4.264	0.000
<i>drought</i> _{t-1}	1.867	0.761	2.452	0.014
<i>flood</i> _{t-1}	2.870	0.518	5.542	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{t-1}	-0.931	0.707	-1.317	0.188
<i>ln Population</i> _{t-1}	-1.067	0.241	-4.430	0.000
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{t-1}	-3.692	0.283	-13.024	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{t-1}	0.429	0.215	2.000	0.046
<i>ln exports</i> _{t-1}	1.363	0.204	6.671	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{t-1} <i>) * (ln exports</i> _{t-1} <i>)</i>	-0.134	0.032	-4.231	0.000

2.2 Results After Optimal Matching

Table 6: Sample Sizes After Optimal Matching

	Control	Treated
All	5063	509
Matched	509	509
Unmatched	4554	0




Figure 2: Balance plot after optimal matching.

2.2.1 Economic Aid Tables

Table 7: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates After Optimal Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	12.679	0.340	37.302	0.000
treatment	-4.252	0.481	-8.845	0.000

Table 8: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates After Optimal Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	30.147	3.122	9.657	0.000
treatment	-2.703	0.424	-6.378	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{t-1}	3.692	0.386	9.559	0.000
<i>latent repression</i> _{t-1}	0.298	0.256	1.162	0.246
<i>drought</i> _{t-1}	1.255	0.713	1.759	0.079
<i>flood</i> _{t-1}	2.651	0.487	5.440	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{t-1}	-0.486	0.655	-0.742	0.458
<i>ln Population</i> _{t-1}	-0.217	0.220	-0.986	0.325
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{t-1}	-2.421	0.276	-8.762	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{t-1}	0.727	0.206	3.533	0.000
<i>ln exports</i> _{t-1}	1.094	0.193	5.658	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{t-1} <i>) * (ln exports</i> _{t-1} <i>)</i>	-0.107	0.031	-3.502	0.000

2.2.2 Food Aid Tables

Table 9: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates After Optimal Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	9.423	0.371	25.387	0.000
treatment	-2.813	0.525	-5.358	0.000

Table 10: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates After Optimal Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	36.579	3.350	10.919	0.000
treatment	-1.729	0.455	-3.802	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{t-1}	3.773	0.415	9.101	0.000
<i>latent repression</i> _{t-1}	-1.352	0.275	-4.922	0.000
<i>drought</i> _{t-1}	2.155	0.766	2.814	0.005
<i>flood</i> _{t-1}	2.761	0.523	5.282	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{t-1}	-2.381	0.703	-3.388	0.001
<i>ln Population</i> _{t-1}	-0.419	0.236	-1.773	0.077
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{t-1}	-3.395	0.296	-11.452	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{t-1}	0.378	0.221	1.714	0.087
<i>ln exports</i> _{t-1}	1.237	0.208	5.959	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{t-1} <i>) * (ln exports</i> _{t-1} <i>)</i>	-0.103	0.033	-3.153	0.002

2.3 Results After Coarsened Exact Matching

Table 11: Sample Sizes After Coarsened Exact Matching

	Control	Treated
All	5063	509
Matched	923	280
Unmatched	4140	229

2.3.1 Economic Aid Tables

Table 12: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates After Coarsened Exact Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	p-value
(Intercept)	12.845	0.237	54.120	0.000
treatment	-3.118	0.492	-6.338	0.000

Table 13: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates After Coarsened Exact Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	p-value
(Intercept)	27.560	2.844	9.689	0.000
treatment	-2.970	0.444	-6.682	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{t-1}	4.830	0.381	12.675	0.000
<i>latent repression</i> _{t-1}	0.950	0.246	3.868	0.000
<i>drought</i> _{t-1}	1.513	0.878	1.724	0.085
<i>flood</i> _{t-1}	1.603	0.438	3.657	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{t-1}	0.765	1.035	0.740	0.460
<i>ln Population</i> _{t-1}	0.315	0.201	1.566	0.118
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{t-1}	-2.488	0.255	-9.760	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{t-1}	0.917	0.198	4.625	0.000
<i>ln exports</i> _{t-1}	1.850	0.204	9.072	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{t-1} <i>) * (ln exports</i> _{t-1} <i>)</i>	-0.302	0.037	-8.093	0.000

2.3.2 Food Aid Tables

Table 14: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates After Coarsened Exact Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	p-value
(Intercept)	10.871	0.258	42.199	0.000
treatment	-3.111	0.534	-5.827	0.000

Table 15: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates After Coarsened Exact Matching

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	p-value
(Intercept)	42.863	3.159	13.567	0.000
treatment	-1.970	0.494	-3.989	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	2.560	0.423	6.047	0.000
<i>latent repression</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.140	0.273	-0.513	0.608
<i>drought</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	1.504	0.975	1.542	0.123
<i>flood</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	2.180	0.487	4.478	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-1.798	1.149	-1.564	0.118
<i>ln Population</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.612	0.224	-2.734	0.006
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-4.143	0.283	-14.630	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.989	0.220	4.493	0.000
<i>ln exports</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	1.773	0.227	7.826	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}) * <i>(ln exports</i> _{<i>t</i>-1})	-0.247	0.042	-5.953	0.000

2.4 Results for Full Sample

2.4.1 Economic Aid Tables

Table 16: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates using the Full Sample

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	11.139	0.109	102.127	0.000
treatment	-2.711	0.361	-7.513	0.000

Table 17: Economic Aid Linear Model Estimates using the Full Sample

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	35.572	1.388	25.626	0.000
treatment	-3.482	0.337	-10.342	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{t-1}	0.680	0.132	5.145	0.000
<i>latent repression</i> _{t-1}	-1.011	0.105	-9.652	0.000
<i>drought</i> _{t-1}	1.565	0.338	4.625	0.000
<i>flood</i> _{t-1}	2.414	0.222	10.852	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{t-1}	0.465	0.334	1.393	0.164
<i>ln Population</i> _{t-1}	-0.306	0.085	-3.588	0.000
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{t-1}	-3.476	0.139	-25.078	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{t-1}	0.979	0.087	11.256	0.000
<i>ln exports</i> _{t-1}	1.597	0.101	15.763	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{t-1} <i>) * (ln exports</i> _{t-1} <i>)</i>	-0.200	0.011	-18.277	0.000

2.4.2 Food Aid Tables

Table 18: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates using the Full Sample

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	7.903	0.114	69.032	0.000
treatment	-1.293	0.379	-3.414	0.001

Table 19: Food Aid Linear Model Estimates using the Full Sample

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
treatment	-3.206	0.323	-9.928	0.000
<i>Unified Democracy Scale</i> _{t-1}	0.312	0.127	2.458	0.014
<i>latent repression</i> _{t-1}	-0.825	0.100	-8.210	0.000
<i>drought</i> _{t-1}	1.544	0.324	4.758	0.000
<i>flood</i> _{t-1}	1.372	0.213	6.433	0.000
<i>earthquake</i> _{t-1}	-0.649	0.320	-2.028	0.043
<i>ln Population</i> _{t-1}	-0.036	0.082	-0.444	0.657
<i>ln Real per capita income</i> _{t-1}	-4.488	0.133	-33.760	0.000
<i>ln imports</i> _{t-1}	0.532	0.083	6.379	0.000
<i>ln exports</i> _{t-1}	1.352	0.097	13.913	0.000
<i>(ln imports</i> _{t-1} <i>) * (ln exports</i> _{t-1} <i>)</i>	-0.149	0.011	-14.185	0.000

2.5 Summary of Main Results

2.5.1 Graphical Results from Permutation Tests




Figure 3: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. The dependent variables in the models are logged so the coefficients represent a $\beta * 100\%$ difference in the amount of aid a country-year unit receives. The difference in aid receipts for treated units or non-client states and control units is approximately 200% for food aid and for 300% economic aid. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

2.5.2 Graphical Results from Alternative Permutation Tests




Figure 4: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 10% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. The dependent variables in the models are logged so the coefficients represent a $\beta * 100\%$ difference in the amount of aid a country-year unit receives. The difference in aid receipts for treated units or non-client states and control units is approximately 200% for food aid and for 300% economic aid. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

2.5.3 Graphical Results from Alternative Permutation Tests




Figure 5: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 100% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $1 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. The dependent variables in the models are logged so the coefficients represent a $\beta * 100\%$ difference in the amount of aid a country-year unit receives. The difference in aid receipts for treated units or non-client states and control units is approximately 200% for food aid and for 300% economic aid. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

2.6 Summary of Results from Alternative Models

2.6.1 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Per Capita Aid Dependent Variable)




Figure 6: Treatment effects from five models for two alternative aid dependent variables (Aid per capita) using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

2.6.2 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Aid as a Percentage of GDP Dependent Variable)




Figure 7: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables (Aid as a percentage of GDP) using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant except for the coefficient generated after optimal matching for food aid.

2.6.3 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Cold War, 1970-1989)




Figure 8: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

2.6.4 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Post-Cold War, 1990-2005)




Figure 9: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant (except for the CEM estimate for the food aid dependent variable).

2.6.5 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Per Capita Aid Dependent Variable, Cold War, 1970-1989)




Figure 10: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

2.6.6 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Per Capita Aid Dependent Variable, Post-Cold War, 1990-2005)




Figure 11: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant for the economic aid dependent variable but not the food aid dependent variable.

2.6.7 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Aid as a Percentage of GDP Dependent Variable, Cold War, 1970-1989)




Figure 12: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

2.6.8 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Aid as a Percentage of GDP Dependent Variable, Post-Cold War, 1990-2005)




Figure 13: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant for the economic aid dependent variable but not the food aid dependent variable..

2.6.9 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Post-Cold War, 1991-1995)




Figure 14: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. The relationships wash out during this period for food aid but is robust for economic aid.

2.6.10 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Post-Cold War, 1996-2000)




Figure 15: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 20% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $2 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. The relationships wash out during this period but not the previous 5-year period for economic aid (1991-1995) or the next 5-year period for food aid and economic aid (2001-2005).

2.6.11 Graphical Results from Alternative Tests (Post-Cold War, 2001-2005)




Figure 16: Treatment effects from five models for two aid dependent variables using nearest neighbor matching, optimal matching, coarsened exact matching (CEM), the full sample (no matching), and a permutation test that draws randomly selected treatment and control units 10,000 times using a random sample of 100% of the treatment observations and a randomly selected group of control units in each regression. The control units are sampled from all possible observations that did not receive the treatment. We sampled $1 * n$ control observations, where n is the number of sampled treatment units. All of the coefficients from the treatment effects models are statistically significant.

3 Documentary Sources

3.1 Example Text from 22 CFR 126.1 in 1975

PART 126-PROHIBITED SHIPMENTS, TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OR MODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS, EXEMPTIONS, AND RELATION TO OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW

sec. 126.01 Prohibited shipments to or from certain countries.

AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Part 126 Issued under sec. 414, as amended, 68 Stat. 848. 22 U.S.C. 1934; secs. 101 and 105, E.O. 10973, 26 P.R. 10469; sec. 6. Departmental Delegation of Authority No. 104, 26 F.R. 10608, as amended, 27 F.R. 9925, 28 P.R. 7231; Redelelegation of Authority No. 104-3-A, 28 F.R. 7231. SOURCE: The provisions of this Part 126 contained in Dept. Reg. 108.605, 34 P.R. 12039, July 17, 1969. unless otherwise noted. 126.01 Prohibited shipments to or from certain countries. The policy of the United States is to deny licenses and other approvals for U.S. Munitions List articles destined for or originating in Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, any of the area of Viet-Nam which is under de facto communist control, and to or from any other area where the shipment of Munitions List articles would not be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States. The exemptions provided in the regulations in this subchapter, except 125.11(a) (1) and (2) of this subchapter, do not apply to shipments destined for or originating in any of these proscribed countries or areas.

3.2 Example Text from 22 CFR 126.1 in 1985

Title 22-Foreign Relations CHAPTER I-DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUBCHAPTER M-INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS PART 126-GENERAL POLICIES AND PROVISIONS

126.1 Prohibited shipments to or from certain countries.

22 CFR 126.1

(a) General. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals with respect to defense articles and defense services destined for or originating in certain countries or areas. This policy also applies to exports to and imports from these countries or areas. This policy applies to Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Kampuchea, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. This policy also applies to countries or areas with respect to which the United States maintains an arms embargo or whenever an export would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States. The exemptions provided in the regulations in this subchapter, except 123.17 of this subchapter, do not apply with respect to exports to or originating in any of such proscribed countries or areas.

(b) Shipments. A defense article licensed for export under this subchapter may not be shipped on a vessel, aircraft or other means of conveyance which is owned or operated by, or leased to or from, any of the proscribed countries or areas.

SOURCE: Dept. Reg. 108.840, 49 FR 47702, Dec. 6, 1984

AUTHORITY: Sec. 38, Arms Export Control Act, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2778); E.O. 11958 (42 FR 4311, January 18, 1977); E.O. 11322, 32 FR 119, 22 U.S.C. 2658.

3.3 Example Text from 22 CFR 126.1 in 1995

TITLE 22 – FOREIGN RELATIONS; REVISED AS OF APRIL 1, 1995 CHAPTER I – DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUB-CHAPTER M – INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS PART 126 – GENERAL POLICIES AND PROVISIONS

22 CFR 126.1

126.1 Prohibited exports and sales to certain countries.

(a) General. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses, other approvals, exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, destined for or originating in certain countries. This policy applies to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cuba, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Moldova, Mongolia, North Korea, Russia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

This policy also applies to countries with respect to which the United States maintains an arms embargo (e.g., Burma, China, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, and Zaire) or whenever an export would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States. Comprehensive arms embargoes are normally the subject of a State Department notice published in the Federal Register. The exemptions provided in the regulations in this subchapter, except 123.17 and 125.4(b)(13) of this subchapter, do not apply with respect to articles originating in or for export to any proscribed countries or areas.

(b) Shipments. A defense article licensed for export under this subchapter may not be shipped on a vessel, aircraft or other means of conveyance which is owned or operated by, or leased to or from, any of the proscribed countries or areas.

(c) Exports and sales prohibited by United Nations Security Council embargoes. Whenever the United Nations Security Council mandates an arms embargo, all transactions which are prohibited by the embargo and which involve U.S. persons anywhere, or any person in the United States, and defense articles and services of a type enumerated on the United States Munitions List (22 CFR part 121), irrespective of origin, are prohibited under the ITAR for the duration of the embargo, unless the Department of State publishes a notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER specifying different measures. This would include, but is not limited to, transactions involving trade by U.S. persons who are located inside or outside of the United States in defense articles and services of U.S. or foreign origin which are located inside or outside of the United States.

(1) The item is not covered by United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of November 4, 1977; and

(2) The item is to be exported solely for commercial purposes and not for use by the armed forces, police, or other security forces of South Africa or for any other similar purpose.

(d) Terrorism. Exports to countries which the Secretary of State has determined to have repeatedly provided support for act of international terrorism are contrary to the foreign policy of the United States and are thus subject to the policy specified in paragraph (a) of this section and the requirements of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 4801, note). The countries in this category are: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. The same countries are identified pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)).

(e) Proposed sales. No sale or transfer and no proposal to sell or transfer any defense articles, defense services or technical data subject to this subchapter may be made to any country referred to in this section (including the embassies or consulates of such a country), or to any person acting on its behalf, whether in the United States or abroad, without first obtaining a license or written approval of the Office of Defense Trade Controls. However, in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, it is the policy of the Department of State to deny licenses and approvals in such cases. Any person who knows or has reason to know of such a proposed or actual sale, or transfer, of such articles, services or data must immediately inform the Office of Defense Trade Controls.

(f) Angola. Consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 864 of September 15, 1993, an arms embargo exists with respect to UNITA. Accordingly, exports subject to this subchapter are prohibited in accordance with Security Council Resolution 864, Executive Order 12865 of September 29, 1993, and the UNITA (Angola) Sanctions Regulations issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, on December 10, 1993 (58 FR 64904).

HISTORY: [49 FR 47702, Dec. 6, 1984, as amended at 53 FR 11498, Apr. 7, 1988; 56 FR 55631, Oct. 29, 1991; 58 FR 39312, July 22, 1993; 59 FR 15625, Apr. 4, 1994; 49 FR 42158, Aug. 17, 1994]

AUTHORITY: AUTHORITY NOTE APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE PART: Secs. 2, 38, 40, 42, and 71, Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 2778, 2780, 2791, and 2797); E.O. 11958, 41 FR 4311; E.O. 11322, 32 FR 119; 22 U.S.C. 2658; 22 U.S.C. 287c; E.O. 12918, 59 FR 28205.

NOTES: [EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: 58 FR 39312, July 22, 1993, which revised this section, provides that the revision is effective July 22, 1993; 59 FR 15625, Apr. 4, 1994, which revised paragraphs (a) and (d) and added paragraph (f) of this section, became effective Apr. 4, 1994; 59 FR 42158, Aug. 17, 1994, which revised paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section, provides that the revisions are effective Aug. 17, 1994.] NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE: CROSS REFERENCES: U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury: See Customs Duties, 19 CFR chapter I. International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce: See Commerce and Foreign Trade, 15 CFR chapter III. Foreign-Trade

Zones Board: See Commerce and Foreign Trade, 15 CFR chapter IV. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice: See Aliens and Nationality, 8 CFR chapter I. Taxation pursuant to treaties: See Internal Revenue, 26 CFR 1.894-1.

3.4 Example Text from 22 CFR 126.1 in 2005

TITLE 22 – FOREIGN RELATIONS REVISED AS OF APRIL 1, 2005 CHAPTER I – DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUB-CHAPTER M – INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS PART 126 – GENERAL POLICIES AND PROVISIONS

22 CFR 126.1

126.1 Prohibited exports and sales to certain countries.

(a) General. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals for exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, destined for or originating in certain countries. This policy applies to Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Vietnam. This policy also applies to countries with respect to which the United States maintains an arms embargo (e.g., Burma, China, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan) or whenever an export would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States. Information regarding certain other embargoes appears elsewhere in this section. Comprehensive arms embargoes are normally the subject of a State Department notice published in the Federal Register. The exemptions provided in the regulations in this subchapter, except 123.17 of this subchapter, do not apply with respect to articles originating in or for export to any proscribed countries, areas, or persons in this 126.1.

(b) Shipments. A defense article licensed for export under this subchapter may not be shipped on a vessel, aircraft or other means of conveyance which is owned or operated by, or leased to or from, any of the proscribed countries or areas.

(c) Exports and sales prohibited by United Nations Security Council embargoes. Whenever the United Nations Security Council mandates an arms embargo, all transactions which are prohibited by the embargo and which involve U.S. persons anywhere, or any person in the United States, and defense articles and services of a type enumerated on the United States Munitions List (22 CFR part 121), irrespective of origin, are prohibited under the ITAR for the duration of the embargo, unless the Department of State publishes a notice in the Federal Register specifying different measures. This would include, but is not limited to, transactions involving trade by U.S. persons who are located inside or outside of the United States in defense articles and services of U.S. or foreign origin which are located inside or outside of the United States.

(d) Terrorism. Exports to countries which the Secretary of State has determined to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are contrary to the foreign policy of the United States and are thus subject to the policy specified in paragraph (a) of this section and the requirements of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 4801, note). The countries in this category are: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.

(e) Proposed sales. No sale or transfer and no proposal to sell or transfer any defense articles, defense services or technical data subject to this subchapter may be made to any country referred to in this section (including the embassies or consulates of such a country), or to any person acting on its behalf, whether in the United States or abroad, without first obtaining a license or written approval of the Office of Defense Trade Controls. However, in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, it is the policy of the Department of State to deny licenses and approvals in such cases. Any person who knows or has reason to know of such a proposed or actual sale, or transfer, of such articles, services or data must immediately inform the Office of Defense Trade Controls.

(f) Iraq. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses, other approvals, exports and imports of defense articles, destined for or originating in Iraq except, if determined to be in the national interest of the United States and subject to the notification requirements of section 1504 of Public Law 108-11, exports may be authorized of nonlethal military equipment and, in the case of lethal military equipment, only that which is designated by the Secretary of State (or designee) for use by a reconstituted (or interim) Iraqi military or police force, and of small arms designated by the Secretary of State (or designee) for use for private security purposes.

(g) Afghanistan. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses, other approvals, exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, destined for or originating in Afghanistan except for the Government of Afghanistan (currently the Afghan Interim Authority) and the International Security Assistance Force, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. In addition, lists of persons subject to a broad prohibition, including an arms embargo, due to their affiliation with the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida or those associated with them will continue to be published from time to time.

(h) Rwanda. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses, other approvals, exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, destined for or originating in Rwanda except for the Government of Rwanda, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. UN Security Council Resolution 1011 (1995) lifted the embargo only with respect to the Government of Rwanda.

(i) Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses, other approvals, exports or imports of defense articles and defense services destined for or originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo except for non-lethal equipment and training (lethal and non-lethal) to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and the transitional National Unity Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the integrated Congolese national army and police forces, and humanitarian or protective use, and related assistance and

training as notified in advance to the UN. An arms embargo exists with respect to all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and of Ituri, and to groups not party to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

HISTORY: [49 FR 47702, Dec. 6, 1984, as amended at 53 FR 11498, Apr. 7, 1988; 56 FR 55631, Oct. 29, 1991; 58 FR 39312, July 22, 1993; 59 FR 15625, April 4, 1994; 59 FR 42158, Aug. 17, 1994; 61 FR 6111, 6113, Feb. 16, 1996; 61 FR 19841, May 3, 1996; 61 FR 33313, June 27, 1996; 61 FR 36625, July 12, 1996; 61 FR 41499, Aug. 9, 1996; 61 FR 41737, 41738, Aug. 12, 1996; 62 FR 37133, July 11, 1997; 67 FR 1074, 1075, Jan. 9, 2002; 67 FR 15101, Mar. 29, 2002; 67 FR 44352, July 2, 2002; 68 FR 44613, 44614, July 30, 2003; 68 FR 65633, 65634, Nov. 21, 2003; 69 FR 7349, 7350, Feb. 17, 2004; 69 FR 18810, 18811, Apr. 9, 2004]

AUTHORITY: AUTHORITY NOTE APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE PART: Secs. 2, 38, 40, 42, and 71, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 2778, 2780, 2791, and 2797); 22 U.S.C. 2778; E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311; 3 CFR, 1977 Comp., p. 79; 22 U.S.C. 2658; 22 U.S.C. 287c; E.O. 12918, 59 FR 28205, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 899.

NOTES: [EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: 68 FR 44613, 44614, July 30, 2003, revised paragraph (a) and added paragraph (h), effective July 30, 2003; 68 FR 65633, 65634, Nov. 21, 2003, revised paragraphs (a), (d), and (f), effective Nov. 21, 2003; 69 FR 7349, 7350, Feb. 17, 2004, revised paragraph (a) and added paragraph (i), effective Feb. 17, 2004; 69 FR 18810, 18811, Apr. 9, 2004, revised paragraph (f), effective Apr. 9, 2004.] NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE: CROSS REFERENCES: U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury: See Customs Duties, 19 CFR chapter I. International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce: See Commerce and Foreign Trade, 15 CFR chapter III. Foreign-Trade Zones Board: See Commerce and Foreign Trade, 15 CFR chapter IV. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice: See Aliens and Nationality, 8 CFR chapter I. Taxation pursuant to treaties: See Internal Revenue, 26 CFR 1.894-1.